Trump, Xi and the 2024 Chessboard: What an ‘Extremely Strong’ China Call Really Signals for U.S. Politics

Former President Donald Trump’s claim that he had an “extremely strong” call with Chinese President Xi Jinping is not just another campaign soundbite — it’s a calculated move in a much larger strategic game that touches U.S. elections, global markets, and North American security anxieties about China.

According to reporting from Reuters, Trump characterized his latest interaction with Xi as very positive, emphasizing what he framed as strong personal rapport and mutual respect. That framing matters, especially coming from a candidate who first rose to power painting China as America’s chief economic villain.

For voters in the United States and Canada, the question is not simply whether Trump and Xi had a cordial talk. The deeper issue is what that conversation — and Trump’s public spin on it — reveals about the next phase of U.S.-China competition and how it could reshape everything from trade and technology to national security and the climate conversation.

From “China Is Ripping Us Off” to “Extremely Strong Relations”

Trump’s pivot in tone is striking when viewed against his own record. In 2016 and throughout his presidency, Trump repeatedly accused Beijing of “raping” the U.S. economy, threatened massive tariffs, and launched what many economists branded a full-blown trade war. His administration imposed sweeping tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of Chinese imports, prompting retaliatory tariffs from Beijing on U.S. agriculture and other sectors.

Yet at the same time, Trump cultivated an almost personalized diplomacy with Xi. He famously described the Chinese leader as a “very good friend” and repeatedly celebrated their rapport after high-profile summits at Mar-a-Lago and in Beijing. That duality — harsh structural confrontation paired with flattering personal rhetoric — is resurfacing now on the campaign trail.

By calling the relationship “extremely strong” after a reported phone call, Trump appears to be returning to that old formula: present himself domestically as the only American who can be “tough on China” while claiming exclusive access to a special personal channel with Xi that Democrats supposedly lack.

Why Say This Now? Reading the 2024 Strategy

The timing of Trump’s China remarks is not accidental. Several political incentives are converging:

1. Reclaiming the “China Hawk” Brand

President Joe Biden has, in practice, maintained many of Trump’s tariffs and significantly expanded export controls on advanced chips and AI-related technologies to China. According to coverage from outlets such as CNN and The New York Times, Biden’s team has also strengthened ties with allies in the Indo-Pacific, from Japan to the Philippines, in ways that have sometimes surprised traditional China hawks.

That has narrowed the policy gap on China between the parties. Trump, therefore, has an incentive to reassert himself as the original hardliner while also arguing that only he can keep tensions from spiraling out of control because of his “friendship” with Xi. Presenting the relationship as “extremely strong” serves both purposes: strength and stability as a personal brand.

2. Reassuring Markets Without Losing the Base

Wall Street and Bay Street remember the market volatility that came with each Trump-era tariff announcement and Twitter threat. U.S. and Canadian investors are wary of another shock to supply chains and equity markets, especially in tech, autos, and consumer goods. By leaning into the idea of a strong working relationship with Xi, Trump may be trying to calm corporate and financial sector fears that a second term would automatically mean uncontrolled escalation.

Yet Trump also knows that among his core base, “tough on China” remains a potent slogan, especially in manufacturing-heavy regions of the Midwest and in parts of Canada that have seen factories close or jobs offshored. The message he appears to be testing: he alone can be tough without triggering a catastrophic break.

3. Drawing a Contrast with Biden’s Diplomatic Style

Biden has framed U.S.-China relations as a “competition” that must be “managed responsibly,” often stressing alliances and institutional diplomacy. According to reports from AP News and Reuters, the Biden administration has invested heavily in multilateral forums like the Quad and AUKUS and in quiet, lower-profile talks to guardrails around military encounters in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

Trump’s emphasis on a personal call with Xi subtly undercuts that approach, suggesting that in his view, the relationship hinges more on individual chemistry between leaders than on formal structures. The phrase “extremely strong” plays into his longstanding pitch: institutions are weak; strongmen get things done.

The Xi Angle: Why Beijing Might Play Along

Trump’s account of the call inevitably raises the question: what does Xi Jinping gain from allowing this kind of narrative to flourish?

While Beijing has historically been cautious about appearing to wade into U.S. electoral politics, Chinese state media has occasionally highlighted divisions in Washington in ways that support its own strategic goals. Analysts quoted by outlets like The Hill and Foreign Policy have suggested that Beijing sees value in portraying itself as an indispensable partner — even to leaders who once vilified it.

Xi may view a working relationship with Trump, if he returns to office, as an opportunity to cut bilateral deals that sideline multilateral pressure. Trump’s known skepticism of alliances — from NATO to traditional Asia-Pacific frameworks — could create more space for Beijing to negotiate directly with Washington on trade, tech, and security issues, while weakening the unified front that Biden and U.S. allies have tried to build.

At the same time, China’s leadership is navigating severe domestic economic challenges — including a property sector crisis, youth unemployment, and slowing growth. Easier access to U.S. markets, fewer escalatory tariffs, or even just a reduction in uncertainty could be valuable. A perception of “extremely strong” personal ties may signal to Chinese elites that manageable stability with Washington is still possible, whoever wins in 2024.

How This Plays in the U.S. and Canada

U.S. Battleground States: China as a Proxy for Economic Anxiety

In American swing states like Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Arizona, voters’ views on China are often proxies for broader economic frustration — jobs lost to offshoring, shuttered factories, and concern about future competitiveness. Trump used China as a central foil in 2016, and there are signs he intends to revive that theme, but with a twist: he may claim he already forced China to the table once and can do it again from a position of “strong respect.”

According to polling summarized by mainstream outlets such as Pew Research Center and Gallup, American attitudes toward China have grown significantly more negative over the past decade, across both parties. That trend gives any presidential candidate incentives to take a hawkish tone, even while leaving room for cooperation on issues like climate and global health.

Canada’s Balancing Act: Security vs. Trade

In Canada, where trade with China represents a smaller share of GDP than in the U.S. but still underpins key sectors like agriculture and natural resources, Trump’s statements will be read through a different lens. Ottawa has already tightened its stance on Chinese investment in critical minerals and telecoms, particularly around 5G and Huawei, influenced partly by U.S. pressure.

If a potential future Trump administration advertised a “strong” personal relationship with Xi, Canadian policymakers could face a more complex calculus. On one hand, a lull in U.S.-China economic tensions might reduce collateral damage to Canadian exporters. On the other, any rapid bilateral deals cutting out allies could leave Canada further on the margins of major trade and tech discussions, reinforcing a sense of vulnerability that has grown since the detention of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou and the subsequent arrest of the “Two Michaels” in China.

Social Media Reaction: Skepticism, Fatigue and Strategic Anxiety

Early online reaction to Trump’s “extremely strong” China remark has been shaped by three distinct strands of sentiment across Reddit, Twitter/X, and Facebook discussions:

1. Skeptics on the Right

On Reddit threads in conservative-leaning communities, some users voiced concern that Trump is drifting toward what they see as a “soft” stance, worrying that talk of strong relations could mean behind-closed-doors compromises on tariffs or technology restrictions. Others countered that Trump is simply using flattery as a tactic, arguing that he did the same during his first term while simultaneously confronting China on trade.

2. Cynics on the Left

Many Twitter/X users critical of Trump responded with a mix of sarcasm and fatigue, pointing out the apparent contradiction between his past “China, China, China” rhetoric and his new emphasis on harmony. Some suggested this is another example of what they see as Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, where personal relationships are advertised as substitutes for institutions and long-term strategy.

3. General Fatigue and Strategic Anxiety

Across platforms, a recurring theme is exhaustion with great-power brinkmanship. Facebook comment threads on major U.S. news outlets carried remarks from users worried less about personality and more about stability: avoiding war in the Taiwan Strait, preventing further decoupling that could raise prices, and reducing the risk of escalation via miscalculation.

In Canadian-focused forums, users raised concerns that Ottawa might once again be forced to choose sides in a U.S.-China confrontation without having much influence over the outcome. Some expressed concern that a sharp swing in Washington’s tone — either more confrontational or suddenly accommodating — could destabilize Canadian economic planning.

The Taiwan and Security Question Looming in the Background

No discussion of U.S.-China relations is complete without Taiwan. While Trump has at times voiced support for Taiwan, he has also sent inconsistent signals about U.S. security commitments. Biden, by contrast, has repeatedly stated that the U.S. would defend Taiwan in the event of an invasion, though White House officials have often walked back or “clarified” those comments.

Analysts quoted in outlets such as The Washington Post and The Economist have argued that Beijing’s calculus on Taiwan is influenced heavily by perceptions of American resolve and political stability. If Xi perceives Trump as someone he can manage or predict through personal diplomacy, Beijing might view a Trump return as either an opportunity for more favorable negotiations or, conversely, as a source of unpredictable risk.

For U.S. and Canadian defense planners, the core concern is that personalist diplomacy could cut both ways. On the one hand, direct leader-to-leader channels sometimes reduce the risk of accidental escalation. On the other, they can lead to sudden, dramatic shifts in policy without the usual institutional safeguards, leaving allies scrambling to keep up.

Economic Stakes for North America: From iPhones to EVs

For households across the U.S. and Canada, the tangible impact of U.S.-China relations is felt less in high-level communiqués and more in prices, product availability, and job stability. A few key sectors stand out:

Consumer Electronics and Supply Chains

From iPhones to PCs, much of North America’s tech hardware still passes through Chinese factories or Chinese-linked supply chains. Even if manufacturing gradually shifts to countries like Vietnam, India, and Mexico, China remains central. A Trump–Xi thaw could ease uncertainty and encourage new investment; a renewed tariff war could hit consumers with higher prices and business with added costs.

Electric Vehicles and Clean Tech

China dominates the global supply chain for batteries, solar panels, and critical minerals. The Biden administration’s industrial policy — reflected in legislation like the Inflation Reduction Act — attempts to build domestic and allied capacity while limiting reliance on Chinese components. Canada, with its mineral resources, is positioning itself as a partner in that strategy.

If Trump were to emphasize bilateral deals over broader climate frameworks, that could alter the trajectory of North American clean-tech development. A supposedly “strong” personal relationship with Xi might facilitate ad hoc agreements on supply access — but could also undercut the political case for sustained onshoring and diversification that both Washington and Ottawa are trying to sell to their publics.

Agriculture and Rural Economies

Midwestern U.S. farmers and Canadian producers remember how quickly Chinese tariffs during the trade war hit exports of soybeans, canola, pork, and other goods. According to Reuters and AP News reports during that period, emergency subsidies were required to cushion American farmers from lost market access.

If Trump can convince rural voters that his relationship with Xi is “extremely strong” and therefore less likely to trigger unpredictable retaliation, he could blunt concerns about renewed volatility. The flip side is that if relations sour, those same communities may once again find themselves on the front line of economic retaliation.

Cultural and Political Narratives: China as Mirror and Foil

Beyond policy, China has become a key cultural reference point in U.S. and Canadian debates — a mirror, a foil, and sometimes a scapegoat. The framing of Xi as either a rival autocrat or a necessary partner feeds into broader questions about democracy, global leadership, and domestic polarization.

Trump’s narrative that he alone can maintain “strong” relationships with authoritarian leaders — from Xi to Russia’s Vladimir Putin — resonates with supporters who see traditional diplomacy as ineffective and elitist. Critics argue this personalization of foreign policy risks normalizing authoritarian governance models and undermining democratic norms by implying that strongman-to-strongman relationships are the ultimate currency of power.

In Canada, where political culture is generally more cautious about executive overreach, there is often discomfort with such framing. Yet Canadian discourse is also not immune to using China as a shorthand for anxieties about surveillance, social credit systems, and the erosion of civil liberties. Pop culture depictions of tech-enabled authoritarianism blur with real-world news about facial recognition and online censorship, shaping public perceptions in ways that are often emotionally powerful but not always analytically precise.

What Comes Next: Short-Term and Long-Term Scenarios

Short-Term (Next 12 Months)

• Campaign-Trail Dial-Up: Expect Trump to reference his communications with Xi more frequently as the campaign intensifies, especially when pressed on how he would avoid war or manage economic competition.
• Democratic Counter-Messaging: Biden and Democratic surrogates are likely to highlight the continuity of tough measures on China under their administration while framing Trump’s praise of Xi as evidence of inconsistency or naivety.
• Market Sensitivity: Each new comment about tariffs, tech bans, or personal rapport will likely spark short-term movements in markets particularly exposed to China policy — semiconductors, EVs, and major multinationals with deep Chinese ties.

Long-Term (Post-2024 Election)

• If Trump Wins: A hybrid approach is plausible: public tough talk on trade and security; private efforts to strike headline-grabbing deals with Xi on tariffs, investment, or specific disputes. The risk is a more volatile environment for allies like Canada, who may struggle to predict U.S. moves.
• If Biden Is Re-Elected: Continuity is more likely: stable but tense competition, ongoing export controls on advanced tech, and continued efforts to build coalitions in Asia and Europe. The personal relationship with Xi would remain cooler in tone, even if institutional channels stay open.
• Structural Trend: Regardless of who wins, the structural competition between the U.S. and China over technology, standards, and influence is set to persist. Personal relationships can soften edges or accelerate breakthroughs on narrow issues, but they are unlikely to reverse the underlying trajectory.

What U.S. and Canadian Voters Should Watch

For North American audiences trying to cut through campaign rhetoric, a few concrete indicators may be more informative than any description of relations as “extremely strong” or “extremely weak”:

• Tariff Policies: Do candidates propose new tariffs, reductions, or targeted measures on specific sectors like tech and agriculture?
• Technology Controls: Are export controls on chips, AI, and quantum tightened, loosened, or kept as-is?
• Alliance Behavior: Does Washington work with Ottawa, Brussels, Tokyo, and others on China-related policy, or does it lean toward solo negotiations?
• Taiwan and Security Commitments: How explicitly do candidates define U.S. commitments in the Taiwan Strait, and how are those messages received in Beijing?
• Domestic Safeguards: What measures are proposed to protect diaspora communities and prevent anti-Asian backlash amid rising geopolitical tensions?

Ultimately, Trump’s boast of an “extremely strong” call with Xi is less a standalone story than a preview of how China will once again be woven into the narrative arc of a U.S. election — as a rival, a bargaining partner, a talking point, and a backdrop to broader questions about what kind of global role Americans and Canadians want their countries to play in the decades ahead.